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There has been much debate about the impact of globalization on the welfare state, in both 
academia and general public debates. In the academic field, however, there is no consensus 
yet on whether this impact is positive or negative. Some theories, like Rodrik (1998)’s 
compensation hypothesis, predict a positive impact. In economies highly exposed to 
international trade, increased external risk and economic volatility may led to growing 
demands for social protection. In this context, government spending can play a risk-reducing 
role. Other theories, by contrast, predict a race to the bottom, that is, a negative effect. Since 
international capital mobility may lower taxation, this puts social spending under downward 
pressure (Mishra 1999). There are also theories saying that globalization has no effect on social 
spending, and that it is domestic political and economic factors what explains variations in 
social spending (Bradly et al. 2005). 
If we look at historical studies, we can also find examples connecting globalization and social 
policy in opposite directions. Belgian workers, for example, supported free trade in exchange 
for social legislation before 1914 (Huberman 2008). A similar story we find in Denmark, where 
social policy developed in a context of high trade openness (Baldwin 1990). In Germany, by 
contrast, Bismarckian social policy came along with trade protectionism (Rimlinger 1971); and 
French employers argued in the late 1920s that without tariff protection the cost of social 
insurance would lead to dramatic export losses (Dutton 2002). 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to this debate by analyzing the impact of trade 
openness on the evolution of Spanish social spending between 1850 and 2000. Spain is an 
interesting case in this sense. It experienced major changes in its trade orientation, combining 
periods of intense trade protectionism with periods of high trade openness. Interestingly, the 
historical evidence on the evolution of the Spanish welfare state seems to show the same 
puzzle that we see in international studies. In the last decades on the 20th century, particularly 
since the arrival of democracy in the late 1970s, social spending increased along with trade 
openness. However, in the early stages of modern social policy, in the late 19th century and 
early 20th century, Spanish social spending increased gradually in a context of increasing trade 
protectionism. What can explain this apparent paradox? 
I argue in this paper that the impact of trade globalization on social spending is circumstantial. 
It does not lead to an “automatic” race to the bottom or an “automatic” compensation effect, 
but it is conditioned by fiscal capacity. Above a minimum level of fiscal capacity, globalization 
has a positive effect on social spending and the government is able to compensate the 
population for the costs of globalization. However, below this minimum level of fiscal capacity, 
the relationship between globalization and social spending is negative, and the government is 
unable to compensate for globalization costs. 
The results of the econometric analysis seem to confirm this 1850-2000 Spain. From the 1960s 
onwards, trade openness had a positive effect on social spending. However, before that date, 
it seems that Spanish fiscal capacity was not high enough and trade openness had a negative 
effect on social spending. This means that both the compensation hypothesis and the race-to-
the-bottom hypothesis find some empirical support, but the final outcome depends on fiscal 
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capacity. When fiscal capacity is high the compensation effect is confirmed. However, when 
fiscal capacity is low then the race to the bottom seems to prevail. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section summarizes the main theories and 
historical studies on the relationship between social policy and globalization. Section 3 
describes the evolution of social spending and trade openness in Spain between 1850 and 
2000. Section 4 carries out the empirical analysis and discusses the results. Section 5 is 
devoted to robustness checks and section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical and historical background 
In the academic debate there are two main views on the effects of globalization on social 
spending. According to the race to the bottom or efficiency hypothesis, globalization is 
expected to have a negative impact on social spending. The reason is that international capital 
mobility fosters tax competition between governments, which translates into lower public 
revenue and, therefore, lower social spending. At the same time exposure to international 
trade compels governments to reduce taxation to promote domestic firms’ international 
competitiveness (Mishra 1999, Garret 2001, Liberati 2007). The second view is the so-called 
compensation hypothesis. Cameron (1978) was probably the first to observe that trade 
openness and government size were positively correlated in OECD countries. This was later 
formalized by Rodrik (1998), who suggests that globalization might have a positive effect on 
social transfers. The reason is that the increased economic instability associated to 
international trade exposure generates higher demands for social protection. Rodrik himself, 
however, warns that globalization (and especially international capital mobility) may also 
reduce fiscal capacity; so that international trade exposure only leads to higher social spending 
when the compensation effect dominates. 
Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) also found a positive correlation between trade openness and 
government size, but (instead of the demand-for-compensation mechanism) stressed the role 
of country size as a mediating factor. According to them, small countries tend to have bigger 
governments and be more open to trade. Similarly, Epifani and Gancia (2009) found that trade 
openness correlates positively with government consumption expenditure (although they 
found no connection with social transfers). As an alternative to Rodrik’s demand-for-insurance 
argument, they hold that more open economies tend to have bigger governments (only) if they 
export differentiated goods (that is, if their elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign goods is low). In this case, open economies can benefit from a terms-of-trade 
externality that shifts part of the cost of taxation abroad. In turn, Chuaire et al. (2017) argue 
that the correlation between economic openness and government size is conditional on state 
capabilities. In particular, countries with stronger state capacity have at their disposal a wider 
menu of policies to overcome the challenges imposed by economic openness. As a result, they 
might be able to cope with the extra volatility induced by international trade without 
necessarily increasing public spending. 
Other authors, however, have tried to identify the specific conditions under which the 
demand-for-compensation hypothesis may hold. Adserà and Boix (2002), for example, 
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emphasize the role of democracy as a crucial factor in explaining the positive correlation 
between trade openness and social spending. In democratic regimes, politicians may follow 
two alternatives. They can choose between trade protectionist policies or they can implement 
free trade policies complemented with social compensation policies. In authoritarian regimes, 
however, free trade may be imposed without compensating the losers of trade openness (as 
these can be excluded from the political process). Similarly, Nooruddin and Simmons (2009) 
found, for a sample of developing countries, that the positive correlation between openness 
and social spending depends on the regime type. Only in democratic regimes social spending 
and trade openness are positively correlated. Analyzing the case of Spain in 1960-2000, Sáenz 
et al. (2013) also found evidence that democracy reinforced the causal relation from increased 
openness to greater public expenditure. 
From a slightly different angle, Mares (2005) maintains that the positive association between 
trade openness and welfare state expansion depends on the capabilities of the state to 
enforce the law. In Mares’s model, workers in high-risk sectors (facing high income volatility 
due to international trade exposure) will support social insurance programs with costs shared 
across occupations. Workers in low-risk sectors, by contrast, will oppose these programs. The 
final outcome will depend on the balance of power between these two sectors. However, state 
capacity will also play a role. In the presence of weak, ineffective states, unable to collect social 
insurance contributions from sectors that are net contributors to the system, redistribution 
promises will not be credible and workers in the high-risk sector will find redistributive social 
policies unattractive. 
In historical studies there is also mixed evidence on the relationship between globalization and 
the welfare state. Huberman and Lewchuk (2003), for example, found that, in Europe, before 
World War I, social insurance programs were more extensive in more open economies 
(whereas countries less exposed to international trade opted for alternative mechanisms of 
social protection based on labor market regulation). In line with Rodrik, Huberman and 
Lewchuk (2003) suggest that increasing volatility associated to globalization led to bigger 
demands for social protection, which were more easily meet in democratic countries with 
proportional representation. Huberman and Meissner (2010), in turn, propose an alternative 
explanation for the potential positive link between globalization and labor regulation. 
Especially within European countries, where intra-industry trade was important, pressure from 
trading partners to emulate labor standards was a key factor in the expansion of labor 
regulation in parallel to trade openness growth. By contrast, in the New World, where the 
export of differentiated goods predominated, this pressure was insignificant. 
Several individual, country histories seem to confirm this positive link between globalization 
and social policy. Belgian social legislation before 1914 developed in parallel to the first wave 
of globalization. The Belgian labor party backed free trade in exchange of social policy 
expansion and tax reform -to compensate for reduced tariff revenues and finance the new 
social programs- (Huberman 2008). A similar story is found in Denmark, where early social 
programs developed in a context of high trade openness. Specially, export-oriented Danish 
farmers played a crucial role in shaping the 1891 old-age pension scheme. They favored a tax-
funded instead of a contributory program (funded from compulsory contributions from 
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employers and employees) to avoid the increased labor costs this involved (Baldwin 1990).1 In 
Germany, by contrast, Bismarckian social policy came along with trade protectionism 
(Rimlinger 1971), suggesting that there is not a clear link between trade openness and social 
policy expansion. Similarly, in the early debates on the development of social insurance in 
France, French employers argued that without tariff protection the cost of social insurance 
would lead to dramatic export losses (Dutton 2002), echoing today’s arguments of the 
efficiency hypothesis. 
Meanwhile, Haggard and Kaufman (2008) consider that globalization effects on social spending 
are more ambiguous. According to them, the main difference between protectionist and open 
economies are not related to the level of social spending but to the way social protection is 
funded. Protectionist countries (like Latin American countries during the 1960–1970s) tended 
to create contributory social security systems. These implied higher labor costs, but domestic 
companies (protected from international competition) could easily transfer social security 
costs to final prices and consumers. By contrast, more open economies (more concerned 
about increasing labor costs) were less prone to accept contributory systems and more willing 
to accept tax-funded programs (which impose the burden of social protection to the general 
public). 
Queralt (2017), in turn, has proposed an alternative way by which trade protectionism may 
affect public finances. According to him, fiscally weak states may try to achieve higher tax 
compliance by granting trade protection to (noncompetitive) domestic producers (which, now, 
would be willing to pay more taxes in exchange of protection). This, in turn, would allow the 
government to finance levels of public spending otherwise unfeasible. Interestingly, Queralt 
(2017) argues that this “protection for tax compliance” could be qualified as a second-best 
solution for weak states, in line with Rodrik (2008)’s view on second-best institutions. The idea 
is that inefficiencies associated to trade protectionism may end up having a global positive 
balance if it generates “enough tax revenue to finance public spending in the absence of 
sufficient bureaucratic means” (p. 640). 
 
3. Trade openness and social spending in Spain 
Spanish trade policy has experienced dramatic changes over the last century and a half. Figure 
1 shows the evolution of trade openness (measured as the sum of imports plus exports divided 
by the GDP) in Spain between 1850 and 2000. As can be seen, trade openness increased 
gradually since 1850, due to a considerable reduction in international transport costs (Federico 
and Tena-Junguito 2017) and the gradual reduction in tariff protection. This liberalization 
process began to be questioned in 1875, when the government amended the Figuerola tariff 
of 1869. But still in the 1880s Spain signed various trade agreements with its main trading 
partners. The protectionist turn was definitively consolidated with the Cánovas tariff, in 1891. 
Later, the 1906 Salvador tariff and the 1922 Cambó tariff consolidated this protectionist trend, 
leading to an inward-looking development strategy that was promoted by the successive 
                                                          
1 To finance the new Danish old-age pension system, a beer tax was created, initiating a long-lasting Scandinavian 
tradition in which indirect taxes have had an important role in the funding of social policy (see Baldwin 1990). 
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Spanish governments. As a result, the degree of trade openness in Spain decreased gradually 
since the late 19th century (Tena 1999, Tirado 1996). 
However, the lower levels of trade openness are observed after the Spanish civil war (1936-
39), in the 1940s and 1950s, during the so-called autarkic period (figure 1). This is partly the 
result of the collapse of international trade after the Great Depression and the effects of the 
Spanish civil war, but it is also the result of an intentional government policy. After the war, 
the Franco dictatorship pursued an import substitution industrialization strategy, based on 
strict controls on international trade and international capital movements. A very active state 
intervention policy was also applied in domestic economic affairs. This extreme policy, 
however, was gradually abandoned throughout the 1950s, and especially after 1959. In 1957-
59 an economic crisis originated in the external sector occurred. The lack of dynamism of the 
Spanish exports plus a big overvaluation of the Spanish peseta led to a big deficit in the 
commercial balance. To correct this, the government devised the so-called 1959 Stabilization 
Plan. The peseta was devaluated to gain international competitiveness and a strict monetary 
policy was implemented to defend the new exchange rate. In parallel, a number of liberalizing 
measures were introduced and most aggressive forms of state intervention were abandoned. 
State controls over private investment (including foreign direct investment) diminished, and 
the economy became gradually more open to international trade (Prados de la Escosura et al. 
2012, Carreras and Tafunell 2018). This process continued and consolidated with the advent of 
democracy in 1977 and the degree of trade openness of the Spanish economy increased 
steadily until 2000 (figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Trade openness (in logs) in Spain, 1850-2000 
 
Source: Tena (2005). 
 
As for the evolution of social spending, the Spanish case shows changing patterns too (figure 
2). The origins of Spanish modern social policy can be traced back until at least 1883, when the 
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objective of the Commission was to propose solutions to improve the living conditions of the 
working class, but its activities hardly translated into specific measures until 1900, when the 
government passed the law on workers' compensation, providing benefits to industrial 
workers injured in the workplace. The impact of this measure, however, was very limited. Legal 
benefits were very low and companies often failed to fulfil their commitments because of the 
lack of inspection (Silvestre and Pons 2010). Shortly afterwards, in 1908, the government 
introduced a voluntary, state-subsidized old-age insurance scheme. But, again, this program 
had a very limited impact. In 1918, barely 1% of the workforce was covered, largely due to 
scarce public funding (Elu 2010). None of these measures resulted in a significant increase in 
social spending, which continued to be dominated by traditional poor relief and remained 
stagnant with fluctuations between 1850 and 1918 (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. Spanish public social spending (% of GDP), 1850-2000  
 
Source: Espuelas (2013). Note: The data fits the definitions of social spending by the OECD and includes social 
spending by the Spanish central government, the autonomous communities, and Social Security institutions. Local 
social spending has not been included for two reasons. First, the development of social spending in Spain was the 
sole responsibility of the central government and the autonomous communities that absorbed part of its 
competences after the restoration of democracy in 1977. Second, the series offered by Espuelas (2013) on local 
social spending has many gaps, entailing an unnecessary loss of information for the econometric analysis (less than 
90 observations are available). Following Lindert (2004), civil servants’ pensions have also been excluded because 
they do not represent benefits for the general population, but are rather the result of the particular employment 
relation between the state and its employees. 
 
This began to change in the turbulent years after World War I, when the government 
established a compulsory old-age pension scheme (replacing the former old-age voluntary 
scheme); and the introduction of various new programs (such as maternity insurance, 
unemployment insurance or the extension of workers' compensation to rural workers) was 
discussed. However, none of these programs were eventually passed before the Primo de 









































































































































(1931-36), social policy regained momentum and the social programs that had already been 
discussed in the early 1920s were introduced. Thus, maternity leave was declared mandatory; 
a voluntary, state-subsidized unemployment insurance scheme was established; and workers’ 
compensation was extended to rural workers. The government also tried to create a new 
health insurance (providing sickness leave and health-care), which was to be integrated 
together with existing programs into a single, unified social security system. However, political 
discussion over this plan dragged on for years, so that it could not finally be passed before the 
1936 military coup (Samaniego 1988). As a result, social spending began to grow after 1919, 
but even in 1935 it was still below 1% of GDP (figure 2). 
The development of social policy in Spain throughout this period was, in fact, slower than in 
most European countries (Lindert 2004). Late economic development, low population ageing, 
and difficulties to consolidate democracy are probably the most important explanatory factors. 
But there are two additional factors that played a crucial role in Spain: weak fiscal capacity and 
continued business opposition to social insurance. 
Public deficits were constant in the early decades of the 20th century. The government 
unsuccessfully tried to reform the tax system on various occasions since 1909. Among these 
projects, the one presented by Santiago Alba in 1916 to create a tax on extraordinary business 
profits, or the attempts to create a sales tax in 1918 and 1919, and an income tax in 1920, 
1921, and 1922 stand out. None of these projects were passed. Even when the income tax was 
finally established in 1932, it was a very moderate reform, with low collection capacity (Comín 
1996). Faced with this lack of fiscal capacity, the Spanish government was reluctant to assume 
the cost of new social programs. That is why the government initially advocated for voluntary 
schemes, and then, when social demands increased (after World War I and during the II 
Republic), opted for compulsory schemes, which were financed by employers’ and employees’ 
contributions with little public subsidy. This, however, generated strong business opposition, 
especially from rural owners and small and medium-sized businesses. These groups opposition 
to social insurance was, indeed, common also in other European countries (Mares 2003). 
However, unlike countries like Germany, for example, where big companies were of greatest 
importance, in Spain, small and medium-sized companies were predominant; making the 
problem of business opposition more acute. 
After the Spanish Civil War (1936-39), Franco’s dictatorship (1939-76/77) established a 
conservative social insurance model. The social insurance schemes introduced before the civil 
war continued in operation, with the only exception on unemployment insurance, which was 
abolished and not reintroduced until 1961. But some new programs were also launched. In 
1938, for example, the government introduced a family allowances program (Subsidio 
familiar), providing bonus payment to all wage earners depending on the number of children. 
And, in 1942-44, a compulsory health insurance scheme was also established. However, social 
insurance coverage was largely limited to low- and medium-income industrial workers2; and 
social benefits were low (Pons and Vilar 2014). As a result, social spending remained low and 
stagnant around 3% of GDP, between 1945 and 1965 (figure 2). 
                                                          
2 Rural laborers were excluded from old-age pensions before 1943. Permanent rural laborers were excluded from 
health insurance until 1953, and non-permanent rural laborers until 1958. 
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Moreover, this meager social safety net was almost exclusively financed by employers’ and 
employees’ compulsory contributions. The government contributed to social insurance with 
very little public subsidy. This allowed Franco dictatorship to finance its meager social policy 
without increasing taxation, and this time it seems that employers showed little opposition to 
social insurance. The strong repression of the labor movement along with trade protectionism 
allowed companies to easily transfer the cost of social insurance to wages and final prices 
(Espuelas 2012). This, however, started changing in the mid-1960s. After the liberalizing 
measures introduced in parallel with the 1959 Stabilization Plan, the Spanish economy 
initiated a period of rapid economic growth, which in turn led to increasing demands for social 
protection. Moreover, a clandestine labor movement expanded during the 1960s. The 
Collective Bargaining Act (into effect since 1961) allowed employees to negotiate their working 
conditions with employers. Strikes remained illegal, but after 1963 they became a common 
instrument in collective bargaining, and organized labor took advantage of the new legislation 
to expand (Molinero and Ysas 1998). This, along with university student opposition 
movements plus the rise of social catholic groups supporting labor demands, became the main 
source of political instability faced by Franco dictatorship in the 1970s (Tusell 2005). 
In response to this new political context, a new Social Insurance Act was passed in 1963 
(coming into effect in 1967). Preexisting social insurance schemes were unified within a single 
social security system, and coverage was extended to all wage-earners (albeit the population 
without stable ties to the labor market remained unprotected). As a result, social spending 
started to grow rapidly after 1967 (figure 2). Since the funding of social security relied on 
employers’ and employees’ compulsory contributions, increasing social spending translated 
into increasing labor costs for Spanish companies. However, increased workers’ bargaining 
power and growing exposure to international competition prevented Spanish companies to 
transfer the cost of social insurance to wages and final prices as easily as before. In the 1970s 
employers' complaints about compulsory contributions became a commonplace (Espuelas 
2012). 
This gradually changed with the restoration of democracy in 1977 and the tax reform that 
came with it. Income tax was introduced in 1978 and a new VAT (replacing the former 
transactions and luxury taxes) was established in 1986 (Torregrosa-Hetaland 2015). This 
allowed for a continued expansion of social spending. Health care became universal in 1986, 
old-age and disability non-contributory pensions were introduced in 1990; and minimum 
income programs were gradually introduced by regional governments also in the 1990s. As a 
result, social spending continued to grow after the arrival of democracy until it stabilized 
during the 1980s and especially after 1993 (figure 2). 
From the Spanish historical experience, it is hard to find a clear link between trade 
globalization and social spending. Before the Spanish civil war (especially after World War I), 
social spending grew (albeit with difficulties) in a context of increasing trade protectionism. 
During this time period, there were no attempts to reach agreements such as those 
implemented in Denmark or Belgium to develop tax-funded social programs in exchange for 
support for trade liberalism. After the 1891 protectionist turn, the inward-looking 
development strategy was not questioned at any time by successive governments (and the 
persistent unwillingness of the government to increase taxation must have made this type of 
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agreements unappealing). Before 1913, the government response to compensate workers for 
the 19th century “grain invasion” was limited to trade protectionism (Betrán and Pons 2011). 
And, as already mentioned, after World War I, social spending increased gradually but in a 
context of increasing trade protectionism. 
After the Spanish civil war, trade protectionism (plus the repression of the labor movement) 
reduced the customary employers’ opposition to social insurance. To some extent this 
resembles the argument “protection for tax compliance” developed by Queralt (2017). 
However, as mentioned before, once a very basic social safety net was established by 1945, 
social spending remained stagnant until the mid-1960s (in a context of high trade 
protectionism); and after 1967, social spending grew in a context of increasing trade openness 
(both during the last years of the dictatorship and in today’s democracy), suggesting that trade 
openness and social spending could be positively correlated. 
In this sense, it is interesting to note the change in attitude of employers towards social policy 
in this later period. In official documents from 1980 and 1982 on the situation of Spanish social 
security, the Spanish employer association CEOE (Spanish Confederation of Business 
Organizations) said that: “it seems convenient that social security continues its extension until it 
covers the entire population (…), but we do not agree that such extension should be done at the 
expense of companies” (p.29). The reason, they argued, is that high social contributions 
"discourage job creation" and "represent a real obstacle for our sales abroad, compared to 
countries whose social security is financed to a great extent or to a much greater extent by 
fiscal resources [direct or indirect taxes]” (p. 45). Indeed, after the arrival of democracy in 1977 
and the subsequent tax reform, government subsidies to the social security system increased 
and compulsory social contributions paid by employers and employees gradually lost ground. 
In other words, the funding of social insurance adapted to become more compatible with 
international trade. My hypothesis is that one of the factors that explain why this time it was 
possible to find the way to expand social spending in a context of increasing trade openness is 
because fiscal capacity was greater than in the past. 
 
4. Empirical analysis 
Hypothesis and data 
Partly building on Mares (2005), I hypothesize that the effect of globalization on social 
spending is conditional on the government fiscal capacity. The idea behind this that, even if 
there are demands for compensation due to higher exposure to international trade, 
governments will only be able to meet these demands if they have enough fiscal resources. 
The idea that fiscal capacity can play a role in the relationship between social spending and 
trade openness is not new. As mentioned before, Rodrik himself warned that globalization 
(and especially international capital mobility) may diminish governments’ fiscal capacity; so 
that international trade exposure will only lead to higher social spending when the 
compensation effect dominates. In the efficiency hypothesis it is also assumed that 
globalization reduces fiscal capacity. Here, I relax this assumption. Globalization may reduce 
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fiscal capacity but not necessarily. In some countries fiscal capacity can be already weak ex 
ante (that is, before a potential increase in trade openness occurs). In other countries, by 
contrast, fiscal capacity can remain high after trade openness increases. For example, open 
economies may choose a mix of taxes (for example, relying more heavily on consumer taxes) 
more compatible with international economic integration (see Lindert 2004). Similarly, 
Haggard and Kaufman (2008) show that export-oriented countries are more likely to adopt tax-
funded social insurance system, instead of compulsory contributions-based systems that 
involve higher labor costs. 
From this perspective, trade openness will only have a positive effect on social spending when 
fiscal capacity is high. When fiscal capacity is low the effect of trade openness will be negative. 
In this later case governments could arguably increase social spending by increasing trade 
protectionism and reducing trade exposure. As seen before, this can be particularly the case if, 
as suggested by Queralt (2017), fiscally weak states may try to obtain higher tax compliance by 
granting trade protection to domestic producers. 
To test the relationship between trade openness and social spending, I have estimated the 
following equation: 
SocSp = 0 + 1TradeOp + 2Interaction + 3FisCap + 4Z + 1 (1) 
where SocSp is public social spending (as a % of GDP); TradeOp is the degree of trade 
openness, FisCap is a measure of fiscal capacity, Interaction is the interaction term between 
trade openness and fiscal capacity, and Z stands for a set of control variables. Since the 
objective of this paper is to test whether the impact of trade openness is conditional on fiscal 
capacity, the variable of interest is the interaction term. The data on social spending are those 
shown in figure 2, coming from Espuelas (2013).3 Trade openness is measured as the sum of 
imports plus exports divided by GDP. The figures are those in figure 1, coming from Tena 
(2005). 
As a measure of fiscal capacity, I use the ratio of the central government’s tax revenues to the 
public debt in circulation (also of the central government). This ratio aims at capturing the 
ability of the government to raise public revenues as it assumes new functions. If the ratio is 
low (that is, if tax revenues are small in relation to the public debt in circulation) this means 
that the government is unable to raise enough taxes to meet its obligations (and needs to rely 
on external funding). By contrast, the larger this quotient is (the bigger tax revenues in relation 
to public debt), the greater the state’s fiscal capacity is assumed to be. The data come from 
Comín and Díaz (2005). This measure is preferred to alternative measures of fiscal capacity 
(like taxation as a share of GDP). Since it puts taxation revenue in relation to public debt, it 
gives us an indication of fiscal capacity no matter the size of the public sector. By contrast, if 
we use taxation as a share of GDP, we could find that a small government (whose tax revenue 
is 10% of GDP), for example, can have sound public finances; while a bigger government 
(collecting, for example, 20% of GDP) could be more in debt (which means that this situation 
would probably be unsustainable in the medium- or long-run and that this government would 
                                                          
3 The years of the Spanish civil war, 1936-39, have not been included in the analysis because of the lack of data. 
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be unable to assume new costs -like new social programs-). Nevertheless, in later sections, I 
show that the results are robust to the use of alternative measures of fiscal capacity. 
The control variables include a group of variables common in quantitative studies on the 
determinants of social spending. Specifically, I have included the GDP per capita, the 
percentage of population over 65 years old, and the level of inequality. GDP per capita figures 
come from Prados de la Escosura (2003). The data on the population over 65 years old come 
from Nicolau (2005); and inequality figures correspond to the Gini index devised by Prados de 
la Escosura (2008). Since the role of democracy has been often emphasized in empirical studies 
on the determinants of social spending (Lindert 2004), one additional obvious control is the 
political regime. Moreover, as mentioned before, there are theories noting that the positive 
correlation between social spending and trade openness predicted by the compensation 
hypothesis depends on the existence of democracy. To capture the potential effect of the 
political regime I have included three dummy variables, which take value one in the years of 
universal male suffrage (1868-77; 1890-1922), democracy (1931-36; 1977-2000) and 
dictatorship (1923-30; 1939-76), and value zero otherwise. This means that the years of census 
suffrage or elite democracy have been used as a baseline.4 Finally, I have also included the 
share of seats of left-wing parties in the years of universal male suffrage and democracy (Hicks 
1999); and the number of government changes in the years of dictatorship to capture the 
potential positive effect of political instability (Cutler and Johnson 2004). The data come from 
Linz et al. (2005) and Urquijo (2001), respectively. All the variables in the analysis are in 
logarithms to derive elasticities.   
 
Results and discussion 
Since the analysis involves time series, I have first checked whether the series are stationary or 
not. I applied both the augmented Dickey-Fuller test and the Phillips-Perron test to the series 
included in the model. The results are shown in table 1, and indicate that all of them are 
integrated series of order one, I (1). Next, I have tested whether the series are cointegrated. I 
applied the Engle-Granger cointegration test to the residuals of the OLS estimation in column 
3, table 3. The results confirm that the series are cointegrated (see table 2). When the series 
are cointegrated, the OLS estimator is consistent, but it presents problems of asymptotic bias 
and is not an efficient estimator. Therefore, in addition to the Least Squares estimation, I have 
also reported the results from the Fully Modified Least Squares (FMOLS) estimation. FMOLS 
use a semi-parametric correction of the least-squares estimator to deal with the potential 
problems arising from the existence of a cointegrating relation, and is asymptotically efficient 
(Phillips and Hansen 1990).  
 
 
                                                          
4 Following Espuelas (2017), I have classified Spain as a democracy from Boix et al. (2012). In the remaining years, 
Spain has been classified as a dictatorship when the variable xconst of Marshall and Jaggers (2010) takes value 1 
(that is, when the executive has unlimited authority), and as universal male suffrage when the right to vote formally 
existed but Boix et al. (2012) do not consider it as a fully democratic period. 
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Table 1. Unit root tests 




Phillips-Perron  Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller  
Phillips-Perron  
 t-Statistic  t-Statistic   t-Statistic  t-Statistic  
In levels:                  
Log(social spending) -0.060  0.050   -1.849  -2.039  
Log(GDP per capita) 1.706  2.076   -0.467  -0.269  
Log(population 65) 3.711  3.278   0.164  -0.259  
Log(Gini) -2.545  -2.446   -2.535  -2.437  
Log(openness) -2.108  -2.049   -2.694  -2.600  
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) -0.840  -0.743   -1.761  -1.580  
          
In differences:          
Log(social spending) -16.243***  -17.229***   -16.217***  -17.362***  
Log(GDP per capita) -9.589***  -9.589***   -9.920***  -9.896***  
Log(population 65) -14.610***  -14.558***   -15.728***  -15.238***  
Log(Gini) -14.349***  -14.438***   -14.302***  -14.392***  
Log(openness) -10.241***  -13.403***   -10.265***  -13.397***  
Log(fiscal revenues/public debt) -8.823***  -8.851***    -8.794***  -8.823***  
Null hypothesis: the variable has a unit root, * rejection at 10%, ** rejection at 5%, *** rejection at 1%. 
 
 
Table 2. Engel-Granger cointegration test on residuals 
Model specification t-statistic p-value 
    
none  -6.816 0.008 
constant  -7.039 0.009 
trend and constant -7.046 0.016 
Note: test from the regression in table 3, column 3. 
Null hypothesis: series are not cointegrated. 
 
The results of the regression analysis are shown in table 3 (OLS results in columns 1 to 3, and 
FMOLS results in columns 4 to 6). In columns 1 and 4, I report univariate regressions of social 
spending on trade openness, which initially show a negative coefficient. However, when fiscal 
capacity and the interaction term between fiscal capacity and trade openness are added to the 
regression (columns 2 and 5) the coefficient associated to trade openness turns positive. More 
interestingly, the coefficient associated to the interaction term between trade openness and 
fiscal capacity is positive and highly statistically significant. This result holds for both the OLS 
and the FMOLS regressions. In columns 3 and 6, control variables are included. The size of the 
coefficient of the interaction term decreases, indicating that it was at least partially capturing 
the effect of some of these variables, but it remains positive and significant. This suggests that 
the effect of trade openness on social spending is conditional on fiscal capacity. Greater fiscal 
capacity involves a greater positive effect of trade openness on social spending. Again, this 
result holds for both the OLS and the FMOLS regressions. 
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Table 3. Trade openness and social spending in Spain, 1850-2000 
Dependent Variable: Log(social spending as a % of GDP) 
  OLS  OLS  OLS  FMOLS  FMOLS  FMOLS  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
             
Log(Openness) -0.510 *** 0.315 * -0.104  -0.507  0.299  -0.012  
 (0.157)  (0.166)  (0.378)  (0.322)  (0.270)  (0.495)  
Log(Openness)*Log(Fiscal Capacity)   0.825 *** 0.387 *   0.891 *** 0.571 * 
   (0.135)  (0.219)    (0.221)  (0.289)  
Log(Fiscal Capacity)   -1.461 *** -0.633    -1.622 ** -1.209  
   (0.449)  (0.648)    (0.734)  (0.851)  
             
C -4.172 *** -3.923 *** 8.523 ** -4.206 *** -3.867 *** 7.221  
 (0.407)  (0.676)  (3.719)  (0.837)  (1.087)  (4.855)  
Trend 0.059 *** 0.037 *** 0.007  0.058 *** 0.036 *** 0.016  
 (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.011)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.015)  
             
Controls No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes  
             
Adjusted R-squared 0.892  0.952  0.975  0.892  0.952  0.975  
S.E. of regression 0.876  0.582  0.417  0.877  0.586  0.418  
Obs. 147   147   147   147   147   147  
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. Estimation method is Ordinary 
Least Squares in columns 1 to 3, and Fully Modified Least Squares in columns 4 to 6. Controls include GDP per capita, the share of 
population over 65, the Gini coefficient (all variables in logs) and dummies for the political regime. See the text for details. The 
results associated with the control variables generally point in the expected direction, with population aging and democracy having 





If the effect of trade openness on social spending is conditional on fiscal capacity, then it is 
worth asking when this effect has exactly been positive in Spain between 1850 and 2000. In 
other words, when has fiscal capacity been high enough for Rodrik's compensation effect to 
dominate over the race-to-the-bottom effect? Confronting the actual data on Spain with the 
coefficients associated to trade openness in table 3, we can calculate the years in which 
Spanish fiscal capacity has been high enough for globalization effect to be positive. To do so 
we first need to calculate the marginal effect of trade openness: 
𝜕𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝜕𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑠
= 𝛽1 + 𝛽2 ∗ log⁡(𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) (2) 
Then from the marginal effect we can calculate, by solving equation (2), the level of fiscal 
capacity needed for globalization to have a positive effect: 
log(𝐹𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦) = −
𝛽1
𝛽2
      (3) 
If we take the coefficients from regression (5) in table 3 the result is that the level of fiscal 
capacity needed for globalization’s effect to be positive is -0.336 (-0.299/0.891). This means 
that, according to our regressions, trade globalization in Spain had a positive effect on social 
spending between 1958 and 1998.5 This is illustrated in figure 3, where the log of fiscal 
capacity is plotted against the log of trade openness. 
 
Figure 3. Fiscal capacity vs trade openness in Spain, 1850-2000 
 
                                                          
5 If we took the coefficients from regression (6) in table 3 (instead of regression 5) the results would be similar 




Figure 3 shows some interesting patterns. First, fiscal capacity does not seem correlated to 
trade openness. This means that, as suggested before, globalization (trade openness in our 
case) does not automatically lead to a race to the bottom or lower taxation. The dots situated 
in the upper right corner indicate that in certain periods Spain managed to have high fiscal 
capacity in contexts of high trade openness. The interesting point here is that above the solid 
line (that is, when fiscal capacity is high enough) Rodrik’s compensation effect prevails over the 
race-to-the-bottom effect. During these years the government had enough fiscal capacity to 
compensate the population for the costs of globalization; and therefore, trade openness has a 
positive impact on social spending. These were (according to our regressions) the years after 
1958, when the Spanish economy entered a phase of rapid economic growth as a result of the 
liberalizing reforms associated with the 1959 Stabilization Plan. As seen in section 3, when the 
demands for social protection increased from the mid-1960s onwards, government social 
spending increased in a context of growing trade openness. Subsequently, the fiscal reforms of 
democracy allowed the process of growth in social spending to continue in a globalized 
context. 
However, below the solid line (that is, when fiscal capacity is not high enough) the race-to-the-
bottom hypothesis prevails. The government, in this case, did not have enough fiscal resources 
to compensate the population for the costs of globalization, and trade openness and social 
spending would have been negatively correlated. This seems to have been the case before the 
Spanish Civil War and the early decades of Franco dictatorship. As shown in section 3, from the 
inception of modern social policy in Spain, in the late 19th century and early 20th century, social 
spending grew (slowly) in a context of increasing trade protectionism. Even during the II 
Republic (1931-36) social policy expansion took place in a context of strong trade 
protectionism; and Spanish policy makers resorted to social insurance programs (financed 
from compulsory contributions from employers and employees) to overcome the 
inability/unwillingness of the government to increase taxation to finance social policy. This 
strategy was taken to an extreme during the Franco dictatorship, when social spending 
became almost exclusively funded from compulsory social contributions, and the customary 
employers’ opposition to compulsory was appeased by intense labor repression and high trade 
protectionism. 
 
5. Robustness checks 
One might argue that, in addition to trade openness, the variability of the terms of trade has to 
be considered in the analysis to have an appropriate measure of the external risk. If the 
variability of the terms of trade varies considerably over time, then trade openness alone 
would be a misleading measure of the economic volatility induced by exposure to international 
markets. In table 4, I control for the potential effect of the variability in the terms of trade. I 
have included in the regressions the interaction between trade openness and the variability of 
the terms of trade (measured -as in Rodrik (1998)- as the standard deviation of the first (log) 
differences in the terms of trade). The data come from Tena (2005). To test whether the 
impact of greater exposure to external risk is conditional on fiscal capacity, I have also included 
16 
 
the triple interaction: trade openness*terms-of-trade variability*fiscal capacity. The results are 
shown in table 4. As before, I report the results of the OLS and FMOLS regressions. The 
coefficients associated to the variability of the terms of trade and its interactions are not 
statistically significant; and the coefficients associated to the interaction term between fiscal 
capacity and trade openness remain statistically significant and of similar size. It seems that, in 
the Spanish case, the changes in the variability of the terms of trade are not big enough to add 
anything new to the effect of trade openness already captured in table 3. 
 
Table 4. Controlling for the variability of terms of trade 
Dep. Variable: Log(social spending as a % of GDP) 
 OLS  FMOLS  
     
Log(Openness) 0.032  0.148  
 (0.409)  (0.532)  
Log(Openness)*Log(Fiscal Capacity) 0.467 * 0.657 ** 
 (0.238)  (0.312)  
Log(Fiscal Capacity) -0.837  -1.424  
 (0.690)  (-0.9)  
Log(Terms-of-trade variability) 0.125  0.141  
 (0.135)  (0.176)  
Log(Terms-of-trade variability) 
-0.041  -0.055  *Log(Openness) 
 (0.046)  (0.060)  
Log(Terms-of-trade variability) 
0.003  -0.002  *Log(Openness)*Log(Fiscal Capacity) 
 (0.010)  (0.013)  
C 9.332 ** 8.906 * 
 (3.905)  (5.061)  
Trend 0.008  0.016  
 (0.012)  (0.016)  
     
Controls Yes  Yes  
     
Adj. R-squared 0.975  0.975  
S.E. of regression 0.420  0.422  
Obs. 147   147  
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. Control 
variables are the same as in table 3. 
 
I have also checked whether my results are robust to the use of alternative indicators of fiscal 
capacity. In the baseline estimations I used the ratio of the central government’s tax revenues 
to the public debt in circulation as a measure of fiscal capacity. Alternative measures, such as 
taxation as a share of GDP, were in principle expect to be automatically related to social 
spending as share of GDP. Here, I have replicated my baseline results but using the following 
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measures of fiscal capacity: 1) central government tax revenues as a share of GDP6; 2) the 
inverse of the ratio of interest on public debt to government tax revenue, that is: [1-(interest 
on public debt/gov. tax revenue)], to capture the share of tax revenues not devoted to satisfy 
the payment of interest on public debt. The data come from Comín and Díaz (2005). The 
results are shown in table 5, and as before, I report the results from both the OLS and the 
FMOLS estimations. In all regressions, columns 1 to 4, the coefficient associated to the 
interaction term between trade openness and our two alternative measures of fiscal capacity 
have a positive sign and are statistically significant. The results, therefore, point in the same 
direction as those of section 4, confirming that globalization effect on social spending is 
conditional on fiscal capacity. 
 
Table 5. Alternative measures of fiscal capacity 
Dependent Variable: Log(social spending as a % of GDP) 
 OLS  FMOLS  OLS  FMOLS  
         
Log(Openness) -1.819 *** -2.536 *** 0.250  0.157  
 (0.647)  (0.820)  (0.292)  (0.377)  
Log(Openness)*Log(Tax revenue over 
GDP) 0.490 * 0.721 **     
 (0.268)  (0.339)      
Log(Tax revenue over GDP) -2.369 ** -3.176 ***     
 (0.941)  (1.192)      
Log(Openness)*Log(Ratio interest on 
public debt)     3.335 *** 3.807 *** 
     (1.082)  (1.383)  
Log(Ratio interest on public debt)     -7.613 *** -8.790 ** 
     (2.864)  (3.663)  
C 7.502 * 8.392  10.254 *** 9.397 ** 
 (4.355)  (5.534)  (3.593)  (4.597)  
Trend 0.018  0.029 * 0.007  0.010  
 (0.011)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.013)  
         
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
         
Adjusted R-squared 0.974  0.974  0.975  0.975  
S.E. of regression 0.426  0.429  0.417  0.420  
Obs. 147   147   147   147   
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Standard errors in parenthesis. Control 
variables are the same as in tables 3 and 4. 
 
Finally, table 6 shows the results of a placebo test. I have switched the dependent variable of 
my analysis. Instead of using the log of social spending as a % of GDP I have used the log of the 
pensions of the civil servants, also as a % of GDP. My placebo test is, therefore, designed to 
                                                          
6 My measure includes tax revenues from the central government and the autonomous communities since its 
creation in 1980s. 
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check whether my variable of interest loses its explanatory power when the original 
dependent variable is replaced by a placebo variable (Neumayer and Plümper 2017). Initially, I 
do not expect civil servants’ pensions to be affected by my variable of interest (the interaction 
term between fiscal capacity and trade openness). Civil servants' pensions are related to the 
state apparatus (justice, public order, etc.), so that they belong to the non-tradable sector of 
the economy. I would expect civil servants’ pensions to be related (at least partially) to the size 
of the state but not directly related to globalization. An additional advantage of the pensions 
of the civil servants as a placebo variable is that it is not a purely random variable. Since they 
are likely to be related to the size of the government, this should help to account for potential 
specification errors existing in the baseline model linked, for example, to unobserved factors 
related to the general evolution of the public sector. 
Pensions of the civil servants, however, may be potentially subject to some sort of imitation 
effect (and can, for example, increase when pensions for the general population increase). In 
this case, my variable of interest (the interaction term between fiscal capacity and trade 
openness) would remain positive and the placebo test would be uninformative. The results in 
table 6 indicate that the coefficients associated to the interaction term between fiscal capacity 
and trade openness do not remain positive once we introduce our placebo variable and are 
inconsistent across columns. In columns 1 and 2 (when our original measure of fiscal capacity 
is used) the estimated coefficients are smaller than in the baseline estimates and are not 
statistically significant. In columns 5 and 6 (when the ratio associated to the interest on public 
debt is used as a proxy for fiscal capacity) the coefficients even turn negative and are not 
statistically significant. Finally, in columns 3 and 4 (when tax revenue over GDP is used as a 
measure of fiscal capacity) the coefficients are negative and statistically significant, right the 
opposite of our results in table 3. Overall these results increase our confidence that the results 




Table 6. Placebo tests 
Dependent Variable: Log(civil servants' pensions as a % of GDP) 
 OLS  FMOLS  OLS  FMOLS  OLS  FMOLS  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  
Log(Openness) -0.107  -0.176  0.827 ** 0.891 * -0.291 * -0.405 * 
 (0.169)  (0.245)  (0.287)  (0.453)  (0.139)  (0.210)  
Log(Openness)*Log(Fiscal Capacity) 0.084  0.078          
 (0.098)  (0.143)          
Log(Fiscal Capacity) -0.028  0.076          
 (0.290)  (0.422)          
Log(Openness)*Log(Tax revenue over GDP)     -0.437 *** -0.470 **     
     (0.119)  (0.187)      
Log(Tax revenue over GDP)     1.468 *** 1.525 **     
     (0.418)  (0.658)      
Log(Openness)*Log(Ratio interest on public debt)         -0.429  -0.784  
         (0.514)  (0.770)  
Log(Ratio interest on public debt)         1.236  2.280  
         (1.360)  (2.039)  
C -7.159 *** -8.330 *** -12.982 *** -14.659 *** -8.777 *** -10.588 *** 
 (1.664)  (2.407)  (1.936)  (3.057)  (1.706)  (2.559)  
Trend -0.012 ** -0.013 * -0.016 *** -0.016 * -0.007  -0.006  
 (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.007)  
             
Controls Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
             
Adjusted R-squared 0.778  0.768  0.772  0.765  0.751  0.742  
S.E. of regression 0.187  0.192  0.189  0.193  0.198  0.202  
Obs. 147   147   147   147   147   147   





Historical evidence suggests that in some countries social policy developed in parallel with high 
trade openness, whereas in others it did so under trade protectionist policies. Even in some 
countries, the relationship between globalization and social policy seems to have changed 
from one period to another. Factors explaining these changes are multiple. This article 
suggests that fiscal capacity must have been one of them. The econometric results show that 
in 1850-2000 Spain the impact of trade openness on social spending has been conditional on 
fiscal capacity. When fiscal capacity has been high, trade openness has been associated with 
higher social spending. However, when fiscal capacity has been low, trade openness has 
translated into lower social spending. 
This idea that globalization, taxation, and social spending may be interrelated is not new. In 
the efficiency hypothesis, for example, it is assumed that globalization affects social spending 
by lowering taxation. I relax this assumption and assume that globalization may reduce fiscal 
capacity but not necessarily. Fiscal capacity can be high or low ex ante (before trade openness 
increases); and in some cases, fiscal capacity can remain high after trade openness increases. 
Open economies may, in fact, adopt a mix of taxes more compatible with international trade 
(for example, giving more weight to indirect taxes). This seems to have been the case in Spain 
after the 1960s, when social spending increased in a context of growing trade openness. Later, 
the fiscal reforms of democracy (that led to the introduction of income tax and VAT and the 
gradual reduction in compulsory social contributions) permitted social spending growth to 
continue in a globalized context. 
However, in other cases, fiscal capacity can be low ex ante, and can remain low or even 
diminish when trade openness increases. In these cases, trade globalization will have a 
negative effect; and social spending could arguably increase more easily in trade-protectionist 
contexts. This can be particularly the case when, as suggested by Queralt (2017), fiscally weak 
governments may obtain higher tax compliance by granting trade protection to domestic 
producers. In this case, trade protectionism would result in a sort of second-best solution 
suitable for weak states. This seems to have been the case in Spain before the 1960s. From the 
beginning of modern social policy, in the late 19th century and early 20th century, social 
spending grew (slowly) in a context of increasing trade protectionism; and Spanish policy 
makers resorted to social insurance programs (financed from contributions from employers 
and employees) to overcome the inability of the government to increase taxation. 
Therefore, considering the role of fiscal capacity helps to explain why in some periods in Spain 
social spending increased along with trade openness, whereas in others social spending 
increased in contexts of increasing trade protectionism. This could also help to reconcile the 
conflicting evidence that we often find in both comparative and historical studies on the 






Adserà, A. and Boix, C. (2002), “Trade, democracy, and the size of the public sector: the 
political underpinnings of openness”, International Organization, 56(2), 229-262 
Alesina, A. and Wacziarg, R. (1998), “Openness, country size and government”, Journal of 
Public Economics, 69, 305-321 
Baldwin, P. (1990), The politics of Social Solidarity and the Bourgeois Basis of the European 
Welfare State, 1875-1975, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Betrán, C. and Pons, M.A. (2011), “Labour market response to globalisation: Spain, 1880-
1913”, Explorations in Economic History, 48, 169-188 
Boix, C.; Miller, M.; and Rosato, S. (2012), “A Complete Data Set of Political Regimes, 1800-
2007”, Comparative Political Studies, XX(X), 1-32. 
Bradly, D., Seeleib-Kaiser, M. and Beckfield, J. (2005), “Economic Globalization and the Welfare 
State in Affluent Democracies, 1975-2001”, American Sociological Review 70(6), 921-948 
Cameron, D.R. (1978), “The expansion of the public economy”, American Political Science 
Review, 72, 1243-1261  
Carreras, A. and Tafunell, C. (2018), Entre el Imperio y la Globalización, Barcelona, Crítica 
Comín, F. (1996), Historia de hacienda pública II. España 1808-1995, Crítica, Barcelona 
Comín, F. and Díaz Fuentes, D. (2005), “Sector público administrativo y Estado del Bienestar”, 
in Carreras, Albert and Tafunell, Xavier (coords.), Estadísticas históricas de España. Siglos XIX y 
XX, Bilbao, Fundación BBVA, 873-964 
Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (1982a), “Ideas básicas para un 
programa y posición empresarial sobre la Seguridad Social en España. CEOE (Noviembre 
1980)”, in Papeles de Economía Española, 12-13 (Documentos), 21-31 
Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (1982b), “Posición de CEOE en 
materia de Seguridad Social en cumplimiento del punto V.2 del ANE (Enero 1982)”, in Papeles 
de Economía Española, 12-13 (Documentos), 33-53 
Cutler, D.M. and Johnson, R. (2004), “The birth and growth of the social insurance state: 
Explaining old age and medical insurance across countries”, Public Choice, 120, 87-121 
Chuaire, M.F., Scartascini, C., and Mariano T. (2017), “State capacity and the quality of policies. 
Revisiting the relationship between openness and government size”, Economics & Politics, 29, 
133-156 
Dutton, P.V. (2002), Origins of the French welfare state: the struggle for social reform in France 
1914-1947, Cambridge, Cambrigde UP 
22 
 
Elu, A. (2010), “Las pensiones públicas de vejez en España, 1908-1936”, in: Pons, J. and 
Silvestre, J. (eds.), Los orígenes del Estado del Bienestar en España, 1900-1945: los seguros de 
accidentes de trabajo, vejez, desempleo y enfermedad, PUZ, Zaragoza 
Epifani, P. and Gancia, G. (2009), “Openness, Government Size and Terms of Trade”, The 
Review of Economic Studies 76, 629-668 
Espuelas, S. (2012): "Are dictatorships less redistributive? A comparative analysis of social 
spending in Europe (1950-1980)", European Review of Economic History, 16(2), 211-232 
Espuelas, S. (2013): La evolución del gasto social público en España, 1850-2005, Estudios de 
Historia Económica (63), Madrid: Banco de España 
Espuelas, S. (2017), “Political regime and public social spending in Spain: a time series analysis 
(1850-2000)”, Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic 
History, 35(3), 355-386 
Federico, G. and Tena-Junguito, A. (2017), “A tale of two globalizations: gains from trade and 
openness 1800-2010”, Review of World Economics, 153, 601-626 
Garret, G. (2001), “Globalization and government spending around the world”, Studies in 
Comparative International Development, 35(4), 3-29 
Haggard, S. and Kaufman R. R. (2008), Development, Democracy and Welfare States. Latin 
America, East Asia and Eastern Europe, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press 
Hicks, A. (1999), Social Democracy and Welfare Capitalism, A Century of Income Security 
Politics, Cornell UP 
Huberman, M. (2008), “Ticket to trade: Belgian labour and globalization before 1914”, 
Economic History Review, 61(2), 326-359 
Huberman, M. and Lewchuk, W. (2003), “European economic integration and the labour 
compact, 1850-1913”, European Review of Economic History, 7(1), 3-41 
Huberman, M. and Meissner, C.M. (2010), “Riding the Wave of Trade: The Rise of Labor 
Regulation in the Golden Age of Globalization”, Journal of Economic History, 70(3), 657-685 
Liberati, P. (2007), “Trade openness, capital openness and government size”, Journal of Public 
Policy, 27(2), 215-247 
Lindert, P.H. (2004), Growing public social spending and economic growth since the eighteenth 
century, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
Linz, J.J.; Montero, J.R.; and Ruiz, A.M. (2005), “Elecciones y política”, in Carreras, A. and 
Tafunell, X. (coords.), Estadísticas históricas de España: siglos XIX y XX. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA 
Mares, I. (2003), The Politics of Social Risk: Business and Welfare State Development, 
Cambridge UP, Cambridge 
23 
 
Mares, I. (2005), “Social protection around the world. External insecurity, state capacity, and 
domestic political cleavages”, Comparative Political Studies, 38(6), 623-651 
Marshall, M.G. and Jaggers, K. (2010), Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800–2009, Fairfax, VA: Center for Systemic Peace, George Mason University. 
Mishra, R. (1999). Globalization and the Welfare State. Northampton, MA: Edward Elger 
Molinero, C. and Ysas, P. (1998), Productores disciplinados y minorías subversivas. Clase obrera 
y conflictividad laboral en la España franquista, Madrid, Siglo XXI Editores 
Neumayer, E. and Plümper, T. (2017), Robustness Tests for Quantitative Research, Cambridge, 
Cambridge UP 
Nicolau, R. (2005), “Población, salud, y actividad”, in Carreras, Albert and Tafunell, Xavier 
(coords.), Estadísticas históricas de España. Siglos XIX y XX, Bilbao, Fundación BBVA, 1027-1154 
Nooruddin, I. and Simmons, J.W. (2009), “Openness, uncertainty, and social spending: 
implications for the globalization-welfare state debate”, International Studies Quarterly, 53, 
841-866  
Phillips, P.C.B. and Hansen, B.E. (1990), “Statistical Inference in Instrumental Variables 
Regression with I(1) Processes”, Review of Economics Studies, 57, 99-125 
Pons, J. and Vilar, M. (2014), El Seguro de salud privado y público en España. Su análisis en 
perspectiva histórica, PUZ, Zaragoza. 
Prados de la Escosura, L. (2003), El progreso económico de España 1850-2000, Bilbao, 
Fundación BBVA 
Prados de la Escosura, L. (2008), “Inequality, poverty and the Kuznets curve in Spain, 1850–
2000”, European Review of Economic History, 12, 287–324 
Prados de la Escosura, L., Rosés, J.R., and Sanz-Villaroya, I. (2012), “Economic reforms and 
growth in Franco’s Spain”, Revista de Historia Económica, Journal of Iberian and Latin 
American Economic History, 30(1), 45-89 
Queralt, D. (2017), “Protection not for sale, but for tax compliance”, International Studies 
Quarterly, 61, 631-641 
Rimlinger, G.V. (1971), Welfare policy and industrialization in Europe, America and Russia, 
Gregg Revivals, UK 
Rodrik, D. (1998), “Why do more open economies have bigger governments?”, Journal of 
Political Economy, 106(5), 997-1032 
Rodrik, D. (2008), “Second-best institutions”, American Economic Review: paper & 
proceedings, 98(2), 100-104 
Sáenz, E.; Sabaté, M.; and Gadea, M.D. (2013), “Trade openness and public expenditure. The 
Spanish case, 1960–2000”, Public Choice, 154(3), 173-195 
24 
 
Samaniego, M. (1988), La Unificación de los Seguros Sociales a Debate. La Segunda república, 
Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, Madrid 
Silvestre, J. and Pons, J. (2010), “El seguro de accidentes del trabajo, 1900-1935. El alcance de 
las indemnizaciones, la asistencia sanitaria y la prevención”, in: Pons, J. and Silvestre, J. (eds.), 
Los orígenes del Estado del Bienestar en España, 1900-1945: los seguros de accidentes de 
trabajo, vejez, desempleo y enfermedad, PUZ, Zaragoza 
Tena, A. (2005): “Sector exterior”, in Carreras, A. and Tafunell, X. (coords.), Estadísticas 
históricas de España: siglos XIX y XX. Bilbao: Fundación BBVA 
Tena, A. (1999), “Un nuevo perfil del proteccionismo español durante la Restauración, 1875-
1930”, Revista de Historia Económica, 3, 579-621 
Tirado, D.A. (1996), “Protección arancelaria y evolución de la economía española durante la 
Restauración: un ensayo interpretativo”, Revista de Historia Industrial, 9, 53-81 
Torregrosa-Hetaland, S. (2015), “Did democracy bring redistribution? Insights from the Spanish 
tax system, 1960-90”, European Review of Economic History, 19, 294-315 
Tusell, J. (2005), Dictadura franquista y democracia, 1939-2004, Barcelona, Crítica 
Urquijo, J.R. (2001): Gobiernos y ministros españoles (1808-2000). Madrid: CSIC 
